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INTRODUCTION
There are two different ways to propose constitutional amend-
ments to the voters in Arkansas.' One method permits the people
of the state to propose amendments through the initiative process.
2
Amendment VII to the Arkansas Constitution provides the require-
ments for the initiative process. 3 The other method permits the
General Assembly to propose amendments and submit them to the
electorate for approval or rejection.4 Article XIX, Section 22 of the
Arkansas Constitution provides the requirements for the process by
which the General Assembly proposes amendments.'
1. ARK. CONST. amend. VII; ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see Becker v.
McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 484-85, 798 S.W.2d 71, 72 (1990); Timothy J. Kennedy,
Initiated Constitutional Amendments in Arkansas: Strolling through the Mine Field,
9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 3 (1986-87).
2. ARK. CONST. amend. VII; see Becker, 303 Ark. at 485, 798 S.W.2d at 72;
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 3. Under the initiative process, any group or person
may propose an amendment, gather the requisite number of signatures on petitions,
and submit the proposal for a vote. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 3 (citing E. CRAWFORD,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 47 (1940)).
During the weeks immediately prior to the 1994 general election, the Arkansas
Supreme Court struck from the ballot several proposed initiated constitutional
amendments. See, e.g., Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885 S.W.2d 10 (1994);
Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994). The court's decisions
were controversial because some of the public believed the court was taking away
its right to vote on the issues. See John Brummet, Democratic Process Undercut,
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1994, at 7B. Notwithstanding public per-
ception, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not do anything unusual; in
most cases the court merely applied the same legal requirements it had for years.
See, e.g., Bailey, 318 Ark. at 284, 884 S.W.2d at 942; Christian Civic Action
Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 243, 884 S.W.2d 605, 606 (1994).
3. ARK. CONST. amend. VII; see Kennedy, supra note 1, at 3.
4. ARK. CONST. art. XIX; see Becker, 303 Ark. at 485, 798 S.W.2d at 72;
Kennedy, supra note 1, at 3.
5. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22 provides:
Either branch of the General Assembly at a regular session thereof may
propose amendments to this Constitution, and, if the same be agreed to
by a majority of all members elected to each house, such proposed
amendments shall be entered on the journals with the yeas and nays, and
published in a least one newspaper in each county, where a newspaper is
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The two methods for proposing amendments employ different
procedures and have separate legal requirements. 6 In addition, and
perhaps surprisingly, the requirements of the initiative process gen-
erally do not govern constitutional amendments proposed by the
General Assembly. 7 Because the two methods are each governed by
a separate and complex body of law, a single law journal comment
cannot adequately cover both. Thus, this comment only concerns
the method by which the General Assembly proposes amendments
to the Arkansas Constitution.' More specifically, it is intended to
be a practitioner's guide to challenging and defending legislatively
proposed amendments.
This comment discusses the history of the constitutional pro-
vision governing legislatively proposed amendments and attempts to
demonstrate why amendments proposed by the General Assembly
should be subject to some of the same legal propositions that govern
initiated amendments under Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Con-
stitution. In particular, the requirements for ballot titles and popular
names in amendments initiated under Amendment 7 should be ap-
plicable to ballot titles and popular names in amendments proposed
by the General Assembly under Article XIX, Section 22.
I. HISTORY OF ARTICLE XIX, SECTION 22
The State of Arkansas has had five constitutions. 9 Arkansas's
current constitution was drafted. and adopted in 1874.10 The other
four constitutions were drafted in 1836, 1861, 1864, and 1868."
published, for six months immediately preceding the next general election
for Senators and Representatives, at which time the same shall be submitted
to the electors of the State for approval or rejection; and if a majority
of the electors voting at such election adopt such amendments the same
shall become a part of this Constitution, but no more than three amend-
ments shall be proposed or submitted at the same time. They shall be so
submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.
ARK. CoNrsT. art. XIX, § 22.
6. Becker, 303 Ark. at 485, 798 S.W.2d at 72; Chaney v. Bryant, 259 Ark.
294, 296, 532 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1976).
7. Becker, 303 Ark. at 485, 798 S.W.2d at 72; Berry v. Hall, 232 Ark. 648,
651, 339 S.W.2d 433, 435 (1960). A constitutional amendment could conceivably
pass the legal requirements under one method but not the other. Becker, 303 Ark.
at 489, 798 S.W.2d at 74. This situation has been called questionable and a "double
standard" by the Arkansas Supreme Court, and as such, the court has put the
legislature on notice that it will reconsider the predicament. Id.
8. Legislatively proposed amendments are governed by ARK. CONST. art. XIX,
§ 22. For a thorough discussion of the law governing Amendment VII proposals,
see Kennedy, supra note 1.
9. See Becker, 303 Ark. at 485, 798 S.W.2d at 72; Walter Nunn, The Con-
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A. The Early Provision for Amendment of the Constitution
The first three constitutions were essentially the same.' 2 In
particular, the provision for amending the constitution remained
similar throughout each of the first three constitutions. 3 However,
this provision (the "early provision") possessed several differences
from the current provision. 4 For example, the early provision required
that the General Assembly approve 5 a proposed amendment by a
two-thirds vote of each House. ' 6 Then the subsequently elected General
Assembly had to approve the proposed amendment by a two-thirds
vote of each House for the amendment to be adopted into the
constitution. 17 Under the current constitution, however, the General
stitutional Convention of 1874, 27 ARK. HIST. Q., 177, 181 (1968); KAY COLLETT
Goss, THE ARKANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 1 (1993).
10. See supra note 9.
11. See Goss, supra note 9, at 1-10.
12. Nunn, supra note 9, at 181. The first constitution, which was written in
1836, was a prerequisite for admission to the Union. Nunn, supra note 9, at 181;
Goss, supra note 9, at 1. The second, drafted in 1861, was revised to gain admission
to the Confederacy. Nunn, supra note 9, at 181; Goss, supra note 9, at 3. In
1864, the constitution was rewritten to satisfy the requirements for reentry into
the Union. Nunn, supra note 9, at 181; Goss, supra note 9, at 4.
13. See ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV; ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV. The
changes made in the first three constitutions were minor, such as references to the
supremacy of the United States or the Confederacy. Nunn, supra note 9, at 181.
Punctuation marks, such as commas and colons, were added to the provision for
amending the constitution between 1836 and 1864, but the language remained the
same. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1838, art. IV; ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV.
14. Compare the text of the early provision with the text of Article XIX, §
22. See supra note 5. Article IV of the Constitution of 1864, under the section
entitled "Mode of Amending the Constitution," provided:
The General Assembly may at any time propose such amendments to this
constitution as two-thirds of each house shall deem expedient, which shall
L .. I=.=1 .. L I in all th e
be pliuuhsu in al the newspapers published in this State three several
times, at least twelve months before the next general election, and if, at
the first session of the general assembly after such election, two-thirds of
each house shall, by yeas and nays, ratify such proposed amendments,
they shall be valid to all intents and purposes as parts of this constitution.
Provided, That such proposed amendments shall be read on three several
days in each house, as well when the same are proposed as when they
are finally ratified.
ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 32.
15. The word "approve" and its derivatives will be used to refer to the process
by which the legislature proposes an amendment. The word "adopt" and its
derivatives will be used to refer to the amendment's ultimate ratification into the
constitution by the electorate, or, in the case of the early provision, the legislature.
16. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 32; see supra note 14 for the text of the
provision.
17. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 32; see supra note 14 for the text of the
provision.
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Assembly must approve a proposed amendment by only a majority
vote of each House. 8 Then, the proposal must be adopted by a
popular vote of the people. 9
Another significant difference is that the early provision did not
expressly require entry in the legislative journals of either the text
of the proposals or the tally of the votes cast on the proposals.
20
The early provision also did not limit the number of amendments
that the General Assembly could propose." Today, the current
provision requires that the text of the proposed amendment be entered
in the House and Senate journals along with the yeas and nays.
22
The current provision also restricts the General Assembly to three
amendments proposed per regular 23 session.
24
Clearly, fundamental changes in the requirements for legislatively
proposed amendments took place between the early provision and
the current provision contained in Article XIX, Section 22. These
changes suggest the drafters of the constitutions written in 1868 and
1874 wanted to drastically alter the way that the legislature could
amend Arkansas's Constitution.
B. The 1868 Constitution and the Provision for Legislatively
Proposed Constitutional Amendments
The Constitution of 1868 was the centerpiece of Reconstruction
in Arkansas after the Civil War. 25 The drafters of this constitution,
18. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see supra note 5 for the text of Article XIX,
§ 22; see also infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 5.
20. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 32; see supra note 14 for the text of the
provision. The "tally of the votes" will hereinafter be called the "yeas and nays."
21. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 32.
22. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see also Bryant v. Rinke, 252 Ark. 1043,
1043, 482 S.W.2d 116, 117 (1972). For the text of § 22, see supra note 5. See
also infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
23. The legislature cannot propose amendments in a special session. See infra
notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
24. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see also infra notes 73-74 and accompanying
text. There are other minor differences. For example, the early provision required
a proposed amendment to be published in every newspaper in the state twelve
months before the next general election. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 32. Article
XIX, § 22 requires a proposed amendment to be published in a major newspaper
in each county six months before the next general election. ARK. CONST. art. XIX,
§ 22; see also infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
25. Cal Ledbetter, Jr., The Constitution of 1868: Conqueror's Constitution or
Constitutional Continuity?, 44 ARK. HIST. Q. 16 (1985). The 1868 Constitution
would come to exemplify the perceived ills of Reconstruction. Id. "[T]o the ex-
Confederates it was a symbol of radical Reconstruction, carpetbaggers, and sca-
lawags." Id. at 16-17; see infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a discussion
of what actually resulted from the Reconstruction era.
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Arkansas's fourth, intended to destroy white supremacy, weaken
political leaders with Confederate ties, establish public schools, and
give broad appointive powers to the governor.
26
In their zeal to effect change in Arkansas, the drafters of the
1868 Constitution substantially altered the process for amending the
Constitution. 27 For example, the 1868 Constitution required the General
Assembly to approve an amendment by a majority vote rather than
a two-thirds vote.28 In addition, the subsequently elected General
Assembly needed only to approve the proposed amendment by a
majority vote of both Houses. 29 Furthermore, the 1868 Constitution
added the requirement that the voters adopt the amendment by a
simple majority.30 Another significant addition to the 1868 Constitution
required both the text of the proposed amendment and the yeas
and nays to be entered on the journals of the General Assembly
offering the amendment. 3
In spite of the drafters' zeal to effect what they viewed as
progressive change in Arkansas, the 1868 Reconstruction legislature
was marked by corruption. 2 It spent millions of dollars on nonexistent
railroads, levees, and buildings. 3 In addition, the state debt rose
26. Goss, supra note 9, at 6.
27. See ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. XIII, §§ 1, 2. Article XIII provided:
Any amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House
of the General Assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority
of the members elected, to each of the two Houses, such proposed amend-
ment shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken
thereon, and referred to the Legislature to be chosen at the next general
election, and shall be published as provided by law, for three months
previous to the time of making such choice; and if the General Assembly
so next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments
shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each House,
then it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to submit such proposed
amendment or amendments to the people, in such manner and at such
time as the General Assembly shall provide; and if the people shall approve
and ratify such amendment or amendments, by a majority of the electors
qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly voting thereon,
such amendment or amendments, shall become a part of the Constitution
of this State.
If two or more amendments shall be submitted at the same time, they
shall be submitted in such manner that the electors, shall vote for, or
against, each of said amendments separately.
ARK. CONST. of 1870, art. XIII, §§ 1, 2.
28. Compare the text of the 1870 Constitution, supra note 27, with the text
of the early provision, supra note 14.
29. See supra note 27.
30. See supra note 27.
31. See supra note 27.
32. Goss, supra note 9, at 7; see also Ledbetter, supra note 25.
33. Goss, supra note 9, at 7.
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from three to twelve million dollars with only about one hundred
thousand dollars to show in public improvements.3 4 The ex-
Confederates, conservatives, and other Arkansas natives desperately
sought honest administration and a chance to wrest control of state
government from the domination of the Reconstructionists'
legislature.35 The Arkansas natives' desire to regain control of
government culminated in the Constitutional Convention of 1874.
C. The 1874 Constitution and the Provision for Legislatively
Proposed Constitutional Amendments
After several years of Reconstruction government, a strong
reactionary spirit marked the Constitutional Convention of 1874.
During the Convention, two prevalent themes came to the fore.
First, delegates generally distrusted government,3 6 and, second, they
called for the empowerment of the People. During his acceptance
speech as president of the convention, Grandison D. Royston called
for a constitution that would provide for a government under which
"the people [would] be the source of power."3 7 In their "Address
to the People of the State," the convention members wrote that
"[tihe new Constitution is framed with a view for correcting these
abuses [of the Reconstruction legislature] by keeping as nearly as
may be all power in the hands of the people." 38
Article XIX, Section 22 of the 1874 Constitution, the state's
current constitution,39 incorporated many of the changes that the
drafters at the Constitutional Convention of 1868 had made to the
34. Nunn, supra note 9, at 182.
35. Goss, supra note 9, at 7. "Eventually, the Republicans began fighting among
themselves, . . . allowing the Democrats to take advantage of the political vacuum
that was thus created." Goss, supra note 9, at 7.
36. See Goss, supra note 9, at 8. As one commentator stated, "Rather than
viewing a constitution as a document to enable the government to operate effectively
and responsibly, the citizens emerging from Reconstruction looked upon it as a
means of protection from their own government." Nunn, supra note 9, at 201.
The Constitution of 1874 "incorporated more changes than. any of the other
constitutions in the state's history, and most of [its] revisions were highly rural,
restrictive, and negative in nature." Goss, supra note 9, at 8.
37. Nunn, supra note 9, at 190.
38. 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF ARKANSAS 126 (July 14, 1874). The address also provided that the
Constitution was framed with the intent of "holding [the people's] agents in office
directly responsible to them." Id.
39. ARK. CONST. art. XIX; See Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 485, 798
S.W.2d 71, 72; KAY COLLETT Goss, THE ARKANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REF-
ERENCE GUIDE 1 (1993); Walter Nunn, The Constitutional Convention of 1874, 27
ARK. HIST. Q., 177, 181 (1968).
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constitutional amendment provision. 40 However, consistent with the
theme of empowerment, the drafters deleted the clause requiring
approval of a proposed amendment by the subsequently elected
General Assembly. 41 Under the current constitution, once the General
Assembly approves a proposed amendment, they are required to
submit the proposal to the voters for adoption.4 2 In addition, consistent
with the distrust of government theme, the drafters limited the
General Assembly so that no more than three amendments can be
legislatively proposed or submitted at the same time.43 Clearly, Article
XIX, Section 22 furthered the two articulated purposes of the
Constitutional Convention of 1874.
D. The People's Role in Adoption of Legislatively Proposed
Constitutional Amendments
The history of Article XIX, Section 22 would not be complete
without some mention of the people's role in the process of adopting
legislatively proposed constitutional amendments under the current
constitution. Statistics indicate that the electorate has consistently
provided an important check on the power of the legislature.
For example, an average of two legislatively proposed
constitutional amendments have reached the ballot each general election
since 1938. 44 Of these proposals, the electorate has adopted an average
of one per election. 45 Additionally, the electorate has refused to
40. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the provision
for amendment in the 1868 Constitution. Only a brief mention of the significant
changes are mentioned here. See infra notes 48-155 and accompanying text for a
more fully developed discussion of the law governing Article XIX § 22.
41. Compare ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22 with ARK. CONST. of 1868, art.
XIII., § 1; see supra notes 5. 27.
42. See supra note 41.
43. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
44. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, INITIATIVES, AND REFERENDA 1938-
1992, compiled by the Secretary of State of Arkansas. It is possible that more
than two amendments were proposed each legislative session. However, the Secretary
of State has kept records only of the proposals that actually reached the ballot.
See id. The courts have probably stricken several of the proposals from the ballot.
In fact, all three legislatively proposed amendments were stricken from the ballot
in 1994. See, e.g., Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885 S.W.2d 10 (1994).
However, some of the cases do not reach the Supreme Court, and thus, cannot
be found in a reporter. See infra notes 131-32 for a discussion of the Arkansas
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, it would be pure conjecture
to estimate how many proposed amendments have been stricken from the ballot
or how many proposed amendments the legislature has approved each session.
45. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, INITIATIVES, AND REFERENDA 1938-
1992, compiled by the Secretary of State of Arkansas.
[Vol. 17:765
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adopt any legislatively proposed amendments seven times since 193846
and has adopted every legislatively proposed amendment on the
ballot only five times.
47
Clearly the people of this state have not blindly adopted every
proposed amendment submitted by the General Assembly. Thus, and
perhaps as the drafters of the 1874 Constitution intended, the electorate
has played an essential role in limiting the legislature's ability to
amend the Arkansas Constitution.
II. ARTICLE XIX, SECTION 22
The process of adopting8 a legislatively proposed constitutional
amendment is roughly divided into three stages. First, during the
legislative stage, the General Assembly proposes and approves an
amendment. Second, during the pre-election stage, the Secretary of
State prepares the proposal for adoption by the electorate. Third,
the people vote on the proposed amendment. This comment will
discuss in chronological order the law governing each of these stages
before finally addressing the issues directly affected when judicial
review takes place.49
A. The Legislative Stage
The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that when the General
Assembly proposes amendments to the Arkansas Constitution, it acts
not in its legislative capacity but rather in the nature of a constitutional
convention.50 Thus, the court has concluded that in proposing
46. See id. Those election years were 1940, 1954, 1956, 1960, 1962, 1964, and
1970. See id. In 1970, the electorate refused to adopt a proposed new constitution.
See id.
47. See id. Those election years were 1948, 1958, 1976, 1988, and 1992. See
id.
48. See supra note 15.
49. Although some legal concepts may arguably be associated with a different
stage of the adoption process, this comment nevertheless places the concepts where
they are currently located to facilitate organization and discussion.
50. Coulter v. Dodge, 197 Ark. 812, 819, 125 S.W.2d 115, 118 (1939); McAdams
v. Henley, 169 Ark. 97, 103, 273 S.W. 355, 357 (1925); Mitchell v. Hopper, 153
Ark. 515, 518, 241 S.W. 10, 12 (1922). The court appears to make a distinction
between statutes and proposed amendments. Statutes passed by the legislature are
presumed to be constitutionally valid. Beck v. State, 317 Ark. 154, 159, 876 S.W.2d
561, 564 (1994). Conversely, legislatively proposed amendments generally do not
enjoy the same presumption. See McAdams, 169 Ark. at 102, 273 S.W. at 357.
Nevertheless, once the electorate adopts a proposal, the court will presume the
amendment is valid. See infra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
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amendments to the constitution, something more is required than
in passing ordinary legislation."
1. Approval of the Proposed Amendment
a. Majority of All Members
Either house of the General Assembly may propose an amendment
to the Arkansas Constitution.12 In addition, the proposed amendment
must be "agreed to by a majority of all members elected to each
house."" Although the Arkansas Surpeme Court has not construed
either provision, the provision that requires approval by a majority
of each House has been mentioned in dictum by the court.5 4 The
provision probably requires a majority approval by all the members
of each House rather than a majority approval by a mere quorum55
of each House.
6
b. The Governor's Role in Approval
There is no constitutional provision requiring the Governor to
approve a proposed amendment before it is placed on the ballot.
5 7
Case law supports the view that the Governor does not have a legal
role in the approval of an amendment proposed by the General
51. Coulter, 197 Ark. at 819, 125 S.W.2d at 118; see McAdams, 169 Ark. at
103, 273 S.W. at 357.
52. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22. "Either branch of the General Assembly at
a regular session thereof may propose amendments to this Constitution. . . ." Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added). The General Assembly has codified this constitutional
requirement, stipulating that "[n]o amendment shall be proposed unless it is agreed
to by a majority of all the members elected to each house." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 7-9-201 (Michie 1993) (emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., Wells v. Riviere, 269 Ark. 156, 160, 599 S.W.2d 375, 377 (1980);
Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark. 515, 520, 241 S.W. 10, 11 (1922).
55. A "quorum" is defined as a "majority of the entire body." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1255 (6th Ed. 1990). "The idea of a qtrorum is that, when that required
number of persons goes into a session as a body, ... the votes of a majority
thereof are sufficient for binding action." Id.
56. See, e.g., Jernigan v. Niblock, 260 Ark. 406, 408, 540 S.W.2d 593, 595
(1976). There, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[the House journal shows
the amendment was adopted by more than 51 votes .... . Id. The court was
apparently referring to the provision that requires a majority vote of each house.
See id. Because the Arkansas House of Representatives has 100 members, it is
logical to conclude that the court has construed the provision to require approval
by a majority of all the members of each House rather than approval by a majority
of a mere quorum.
57. See supra note 5 for the text of ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22.
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Assembly. In Mitchell v. Hopper," the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that the Governor had no power to veto a resolution that
proposed a constitutional amendment.5 9 The Court reaffirmed Mitchell
in Coulter v. Dodge,6° holding that the Governor's approval of a
proposed amendment neither added to nor detracted from the validity
of the legislature's approval .61
2. Scope of Legislative Authority to Propose Amendments
a. One Subject Per Amendment
There is no express constitutional provision which stipulates that
an amendment must encompass only one subject. 62 However, there
is some authority that may support this requirement.
63
Proposed amendments must be submitted so that electors can
cast their votes on each amendment separately. 64 In Brockelhurst v.
State,61 a party challenging a legislatively proposed amendment argued
that because electors must be able to cast their votes on each
amendment separately, the "[l]egislature was without power to submit
two questions in one amendment." The Arkansas Supreme Court
upheld the amendment, stating that the two sections of the proposed
58. 153 Ark. 515, 241 S.W. 10 (1922). In Mitchell, the Arkansas Supreme Court
construed both Article XIX, § 22 and Article XVI, §§ 15 and 16 of the Arkansas
Constitution. Id. at 517-18, 241 S.W. at 12.
59. Id.; see also Op. Att'y Gen. 93-068 (March 19, 1993).
60. 197 Ark. 812, 125 S.W.2d 115 (1939).
61. Coulter, 197 Ark. at 818, 125 S.W.2d at 117. The court stated that "the
Governor had no duty to perform in connection with the authorization of the
submission of the amendment .... "Id. (citing Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark. 515,
241 S.W. 10 (1922)); see also Goss, supra note 9, at 111.
62. See supra note 5 for the text of ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see also Op.
Att'y Gen. 91-058 n.1 (March 7, 1991).
63. See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. 91-058 (March 7, 1991); Brockelhurst v. State,
195 Ark. 67, 72-73, 111 S.W.2d 527, 529-30 (1937); see also infra notes 65-68.
64. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; Chaney v. Bryant, 259 Ark. 294, 296, 532
S.W.2d 741, 743 (1976). The Attorney General of Arkansas concluded:
It is often said that the purpose of such a provision is to prevent "logrolling."
"Logrolling occurs when two or more propositions essentially dissimilar
in subject matter are submitted to the electorate in one amendment so
that the voter may cast one expression of his vote answer on the measure
as a whole. The voter is thus bound in order to secure the enactment of
the provision he favors, to vote for others of which he may disapprove."
Op. Att'y Gen. 91-059 (citing Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 449 A.2d 1144,
1148 (Md. 1982).
65. 195 Ark. 67, 111 S.W.2d 527 (1937).
66. Id. at 72, 111 S.W.2d at 530.
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amendment in Brockelhurst did, in fact, relate to the same subject.67
Because it specifically addressed the petitioner's argument, the court
gave at least theoretical validity to the petitioner's reasoning. 68 Thus,
the decision in Brockelhurst provides some authority, albeit indirectly,
to support the proposition that a constitutional amendment must
encompass only one subject.
b. During the Regular Session
The General Assembly can propose and approve constitutional
amendments during a regular session.6 9 In Wells v. Riviere,70 the
Arkansas Supreme Court construed this provision to mean that
amendments proposed and approved during an unlawful extension
of the legislature's regular session could not be placed on the ballot.7
67. Id. at 72-73, 111 S.W.2d at 530. Section One of the proposed amendment
provided that "prosecuting attorneys may file information or indictments may be
had by grand juries, to charge one with crime." Id. at 72, 111 S.W.2d at 530.
Section Two authorized the General Assembly to determine the amount, method,
and salaries of prosecuting attorneys. Id. The court strained to uphold the amend-
ment's validity, reasoning that in the broadest sense, both sections "relate to the
prosecuting attorney." Id. at 72-73, 111 S.W.2d at 530.
68. See Op. Att'y Gen. 91-058 n.1 (March 7, 1991).
69. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22. "Either branch of the General Assembly at
a regular session thereof may propose amendments to this Constitution .... I Id.
It is important to note there are only two types of sessions for which the General
Assembly may convene. See Wells v. Riviere, 269 Ark. 156, 160-61, 599 S.W.2d
375, 377 (1980). The Legislature may meet during a biennial regular session, as
provided under ARK. CONSr. art. 5, §§ 5, 17, or during an extraordinary session
convened by the Governor, as provided under ARK. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19. See
Wells, 269 Ark. at 160-61, 599 S.W.2d at 377. Extraordinary sessions are commonly
referred to as "special" sessions. Although the issue has not been directly addressed
by the Arkansas Supreme Court, it is very likely the legislature does not have the
authority to propose and approve amendments during a special session. The Court
emphatically stated in Wells that proposed amendments must be approved "at a
regular session of the General Assembly." Id. at 160, 599 S.W.2d at 377.
70. 269 Ark. 156, 599 S.W.2d 375 (1980).
71. Id. at 166-67, 599 S.W.2d at 380. Both Houses had approved during the
regular session a proposed amendment to the constitution regarding property tax-
ation. Id. at 167, 599 S.W.2d at 380. The legislature proposed and approved the
other two amendments, which involved usury and court jurisdiction, during an
extension of the regular session. Id. The court concluded that the extension of the
regular session was unlawful. Id. at 168, 559 S.W.2d at 381. Thus, a majority of
the court concluded that only the property taxation amendment could be placed
on the ballot. Id. at 169-70, 599 S.W.2d at 381.
One could construe the holding in Wells to indicate that so long as a proposed
amendment is approved during a lawful regular session, it will remain valid even
if subsequent changes are made to the proposed amendment during an unlawful
regular session. The property taxation amendment, proposed during the regular
session, had been subsequently changed during the unlawful extension of the regular
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Thus, it is likely that legislatively proposed amendments can be
placed on the ballot only if they are proposed and approved during
a regular session or a lawful extension of a regular session.72
c. The Three Amendment Limit
Although the General Assembly is authorized to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the legislature cannot propose more
than three amendments to be voted on by the people at the same
time. 73 If the General Assembly proposes more than three amendments,
the three that shall be voted upon by the people are likely to be
determined by the order in which the legislature approves them.
74
3. Journal Entry Requirements
a. Yeas and Nays on Final Passage
When an amendment is approved by a majority of all members
from both houses, 75 Article XIX, Section 22 requires that the yea
session and "was a different proposal than that approved back during the regular
session." Id. at 167, 599 S.W.2d at 380. A majority of the court nevertheless
upheld its validity. Id. at 170, 599 S.W.2d at 381.
In addition, an argument could be made that when a proposed amendment is
approved during a lawful regular session, it will remain valid even if subsequent
changes are made to the proposed amendment during a special session. However,
the decision in Wells only indirectly supports this proposition.
72. There is a strong argument that amendments proposed and approved during
an extraordinary, or special, session will not be placed on the ballot. See supra
note 69.
73. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see Wells, 269 Ark. at 160, 599 S.W.2d at
377. This limitation of three amendments per session, or the "limitation of three"
rule, should also operate to account for those amendments proposed during a
lawful extension of a regular session. See, e.g., id.
During the regular session of 1995, Senator Malone introduced a proposed
amendment that would allow the legislature to refer five constitutional amendments
to the electorate for adoption rather than just three. S.J. Res. 7, 80th Gen. Assembly,
Reg. Sess. (1995). This measure was referred to the Senate Committee on State
Agencies and Governmental Affairs, but the committee had taken no further action
on the measure at the time the regular session adjourned. See S.J. Res. 7, 80th
Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995) (as summarized in the Westlaw Bill Tracking
database, April 9, 1995).
74. See State ex rel. Little Rock v. Donaghey, 106 Ark. 56, 65-66, 152 S.W.
746, 749 (1912). This will be referred to as the "priorty rule." The court in
Donaghey applied the priority rule to amendments proposed under both Amendment
XIII, the Amendment VII precursor which governed initiated amendments, and
Article XIX, § 22. See id. However, the later passage of Amendment VII impliedly
repealed the limitation rule as to initiated amendments. See Kennedy, supra note
1, at 51 n.398. Although the decision in Donaghey no longer applies to Amendment
VII proposals, the reasoning behind the priority rule likely still applies to amendments
proposed by the General Assembly.
75. Approval requires a majority of all members of both houses rather than
a majority of a mere quorum. See supra notes 55-56.
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and nay votes be entered on the journals of the legislature. 76 Failure
of the journals to reflect the yea and nay vote of each house is
fatal to the proposed amendment.
77
However, in Bryant v. Rinke,78 the Arkansas Supreme Court
indicated that it might be willing to allow the legislature to correct
any flaws in its journal entries during a subsequently convened
extraordinary session.79 The court in Bryant held that a proposed
amendment was invalid where the journal did not reflect the yea
and nay vote on two resolutions after amendment, explicitly noting
that the legislature made a failed attempt duirng an extraordinary
session to correct the problem. 0
b. Entering the Amendment in the Journals
Article XIX, Section 22 stipulates that "proposed amendments shall
be entered on the journals .. . ."I' The Arkansas Supreme Court,
in construing this provision, has established that it is essential to
the validity of a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment that
the journals of both Houses, when read together, show "certainly"
and "definitely" that both Houses concurred in the submission of
the same amendment. 82
76. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-203 (Michie
1993).
77. Jernigan v. Niblock, 260 Ark. 406, 409, 540 S.W.2d 593, 595 (1976); Bryant
v. Rinke, 252 Ark. 1043, 1044, 482 S.W.2d 116, 117 (1972).
78. 252 Ark. 1043, 482 S.W.2d 116 (1972).
79. Id. at 1044, 482 S.W.2d at 117. The General Assembly approved a proposed
amendment during the 1971 regular session. Id. at 1043, 482 S.W.2d at 117. After
the plaintiff filed a complaint, and after it was discovered that the journal entries
did not reflect the yea and nay vote or the text of the proposed amendments, the
Governor called an extraordinary session to, inter alia, remedy the problem. Id.
at 1043-44, 482 S.W.2d at 117.
QA.I ,4 ---A -L-o Jeriga v. . '.en,,1',~ NJihln,., 16 Ark.
406, 409, 540 S.W.2d 593, 595 (1976). The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the
chancellor's decision to invalidate the amendment, but the court adopted only one
of the chancellor's two grounds for invalidation. Bryant, 252 Ark. at 1044, 482
S.W.2d at 117. The court agreed with the chancellor in that neither of the resolutions,
after amendment, were entered in the journal with the yea and nay votes. Id. The
court did not specifically address the chancellor's other ground, which was that
the failure of the General Assembly, in a regular session, to conform to the
requirements could not be cured by action of a subsequent special session. Id.
Thus, the question whether the court might be willing to allow the legislature to
correct flaws in its journal entries during a subsequently convened extraordinary
session is open to argument.
81. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-203 (Michie
1993).
82. Jernigan v. Niblock, 260 Ark. 406, 409-10, 540 S.W.2d 593, 595 (1976)
(quoting Coulter v. Dodge, 197 Ark. 812, 125 S.W.2d 115 (1939)).
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Knowledge of the development of this rule is important to
understanding its application. In McAdams v. Henley, 3 the Arkansas
Supreme Court first addressed this issue, holding that "an amendment
to the constitution is void unless the amendment is entered in extenso
8 4
on the journals of each of the two Houses of the General Assembly,
and . . . a mere identifying reference by title of otherwise is
insufficient." 5 However, in its subsequent decision in Coulter v.
Dodge,8 6 the court clarified its prior holding, stating that the "in
extenso" rule is limited to the facts in McAdams.87
Most recently, in Jernigan v. Niblock,88 the court reaffirmed
the holding in Coulter, establishing the rule that it is essential to
83. 169 Ark. 97, 273 S.W. 355 (1925). The court summarized the facts' in
McAdams this way:
[Tihe House amendment to the [original Senate] resolution was never
entered on the journals of the Senate, and . . . the [originally] proposed
amendment which was entered at large on the journals of the Senate is
materially different in its language and import from that which was
submitted to the people at the next general election.
Id. at 102, 273 S.W. at 357. In other words, the Senate journal did not explicitly
reflect that the Senate had passed the House's amended version of the proposed
amendment. The court held that the amendment was invalid because the omission
in the Senate's journal was of a substantial change made by the House. 1d. at
111, 273 S.W. at 360.
84. "In extenso" means "at full length; from beginning to end, leaving out
nothing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 777 (6th ed. 1990).
85. McAdams, 169 Ark. at 110, 273 S.W. at 360. The court appeared to
immediately retreat from the "in extenso" rule in the very same opinion, indicating
that different parts of the journals could be read together to determine whether
both Houses had passed the same amendment. Id. "Different parts of the journals
of the respective Houses may, if connected up to that the whole of the amendment
as finally adopted by both Houses, appears upon the journal of each House, be
treated as sufficient to make a complete record .... ." Id. In addition, the court
stated that "the omission of an immaterial portion of an amendment-one not
affecting its meaning or interpretation-would not affect its validity." Id. at 111,
273 S.W. at 360.
86. 197 Ark. 812, 125 S.W.2d 115 (1939). In this case, unlike McAdams, "[tihe
resolution was properly entered upon the journal of the Senate, and the resolution
was passed by the House without amendment of any kind, material or otherwise."
Id. at 820, 125 S.W.2d at 118. The Senate journal referenced the proposed amend-
ment, which, at that point, had already passed both the Senate and the House
arfd had been entered on the journals. Id. at 817-18, 125 S.W.2d at 117. The court
held that the amendment was valid because the journals of the two Houses, when
read together, reflected that the same proposal had passed each House. Id. at 822,
125 S.W.2d at 119.
87. Id. at 820-21, 125 S.W.2d at 118-19. In McAdams, the House made a
material change to the proposed amendment, but the Senate's journal did not
reflect that the Senate approved of this change. See supra note 83.
88. 260 Ark. 406, 540 S.W.2d 593 (1976). The Senate materially amended the
proposed amendment, which was originally proposed and passed by the House.
Id. at 408-09, 540 S.W.2d at 594-95. The amendatory language did not appear in
UALR LAW JOURNAL
the validity of a legislatively proposed amendment that the journals
of both Houses, when read together, show "certainly" and
"definitely" that both Houses concurred in the submission of the
same amendment. 89 The court added that when reviewing the journals
it could not make an "assumption or rewrite the journals, but must
scrutinize them as recorded.'"'9
B. The Pre-Election Stage
1. Publication Requirements
a. Publication Six Months Preceding the Next Election
After the proposed amendment has been approved by both
Houses, it must be "published in at least one newspaper in each
county, where a newspaper is published, for six months immediately
preceding the next general election for Senators and Representatives." 91
The Arkansas Supreme Court has construed this provision to mean
that the full text of the amendment, not just notice of the amendment,
must be published at least six months prior to the general election
to which the amendment is subject. 92 The court did not specifically
address how frequently an amendment should be published, but
Arkansas statutory law provides some guidance on this issue. 93 The
the House version or its journal. Id. at 409, 540 S.W.2d at 595. Thus, the journal
entries did not reflect that the same proposal was entered on the House and Senate
journals. Id. at 410, 540 S.W.2d at 595. Consequently, the court invalidated the
proposed amendment because the journals did not reflect that the House and Senate
versions of the proposed amendment were the same. Id. at 410, 540 S.W.2d at
595-96.
89. Id. at 409-10, 540 S.W.2d at 595-96. The court in Jernigan may have
reaffirmed the application of the McAdams "in extenso" rule where one of the
Houses has materially changed the proposed amendment. See id. at 4i0, 540 S.W.2d
at 595-96.
90. Jernigan, 260 Ark. at 40, 540 S.W.2d at 596.
91. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22. Because the Constitution does not provide
who shall be responsible, the legislature has charged the Secretary of State with
the responsibility of publicating the proposed amendment. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-
9-113 (Michie 1991); see, e.g., Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885 S.W.2d
10 (1994).
92. Walmsley, 318 Ark. at 273, 885 S.W.2d at 12 (1994). In this case, Secretary
of State McCuen had published notice of the amendment six months prior to the
election, but, as of the filing of the original action, his office had failed to publish
the entire text of the amendment. Id. at 271, 885 S.W.2d at 11.
93. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-9-113(b)(1) and 16-3-102(b) provide that notice of
the proposed amendment shall be published four times within the six month period.
Section 7-9-113(b)(1) of the Arkansas Code Annotated provides in relevant part
that "notice shall be published in four (4) weekly issues of some newspaper in
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court has also suggested in other cases that a legislatively proposed
amendment should probably be published once a month for six
months prior to the election to which the amendment is subject.
94
b. Statutory Requirements
In addition to insuring that the proposed amendment is published
six months before the election, the Secretary of State has other
publication duties which may affect an amendment's validity. Although
there is no constitutional requirement that a ballot title be placed
on, a legislatively proposed amendment, 9 Section 7-9-113 of the
Arkansas Code Annotated requires that the Secretary of State include
the popular name, the ballot title, and the text of the amendment
in at least one of the published notices. 96 After publication, the
Secretary of State is to "furnish the election commissioners the
popular name and ballot title for the official ballot."
97
c. Compliance with Statutory Requirements
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that provisions of the
election laws, 98 which include publication requirements, are mandatory
each county as provided by law." ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-113(b)(1) (Michie 1993).
Section 16-3-102(b) provides in relevant part that "when a definite time is specified
for publication for constitutional amendments proposed by the General Assembly,
it shall be construed to mean publication in four (4) weekly issues of some newspaper
in each county as provided by law. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-3-102(b) (Michie 1994).
During the regular session of 1995, Representative Flanagin proposed a constitutional
amendment intended to clarify the publication requirements for legislatively proposed
amendments. H.J. Res. 1001, 80th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995). The General
Assembly took no further action on this measure after Representative Flanagin
introduced it. See H.J. Res. 1001, 80th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995) (as
summarized in the Westlaw Bill Tracking database, April 9, 1995).
94. See Walmsley, 318 Ark. at 274, 885 S.W.2d at 13 (Brown, J., concurring)
("I agree with the majority opinion but would go a step further.... The most
logical and reasonable interpretation of the phrase is that the publication must take
place once a month for six consecutive months."); Becker v. Riviere, 277 Ark.
252, 255, 641 S.W.2d 2, 4 (1982) (stating in dictum that Article XIX, § 22 "spe-
cifically requires an extended publication period of six separate monthly insertions
in one newspaper in each county prior to the election.").
95. Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 486, 798 SW.2d 71, 73 (1990); Becker
v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 252, 254, 641 S.W.2d 2, 4 (1982); Chaney v. Bryant, 259
Ark. 294, 296, 532 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1976). See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying
text for a discussion of ballot titles.
96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-113(c) (Michie 1993); see Becker, 303 Ark. at 485,
798 S.W.2d at 72.
97. Becker, 303 Ark. at 485, 798 S.W.2d at 72; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-
9-115 (Michie 1993).
98. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-1-101 to -9-411 (Michie 1993).
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if enforcement is sought prior to an election, but only directory if
relief is sought after an election. 99 Despite this rule, in Becker v.
McCuen,10° the court refused to invalidate an amendment prior to
an election even though the Secretary of State failed to strictly
comply with the statutory requirements regarding publication of
amendments. The court stated that although the Secretary of State's
duties were mandatory, the plaintiff waited until the election was
too close at hand before challenging the Secretary's action.' 0' In
addition, the court stated that mandamus would have been the proper
remedy if timely filed. 02
In the wake of Becker, it is logical to conclude that an amendment
may be placed on the ballot even if the Secretary of State does not
follow the statutory publication requirements precisely. 03 However,
even in a situation like that in Becker, it would be proper for a
court to "strike the matter from the ballot" if the Secretary of
State's actions caused "real prejudice" to either side of an issue."
°4
99. Donn v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 415, 417, 797 S.W.2d 455, 456 (1990). This
means that if a complainant applies for a writ of mandamus prior to the election
and can prove an election officer has failed to comply with the election laws, the
court will issue mandamus to compel the officer's compliance. See, e.g., id.; Becker,
303 Ark. at 488-89, 798 S.W.2d at 74.
100. 303 Ark. 482, 798 S.W.2d 71 (1990). In Becker, the Secretary of State,
apparently inadvertently, added to the designated ballot title language from the
title of the joint resolution. Id. at 486, 798 S.W.2d at 72. The court concluded
that the Secretary of State substantially complied with the statutory requirement
that he place a ballot title on publication notices, and thus, the amendment remained
on the ballot. Id. at 489, 798 S.W.2d at 74.
101. Id. at 488-89, 798 S.W.2d at 74. The court characterized the timing of the
filing of the action as an "eleventh hour" challenge. Id. at 489, 798 S.W.2d at
74.
102. Id. at 488-89, 798 S.W.2d at 74. In Hannah v. Deboer, 311 Ark. 215, 843
S.W.2d 800 (1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court referred to the decision in Becker
and suggested that the mandatory nature of the election laws is not preserved when
the plaintiff seeks the wrong remedy:
In Becker, ... we dealt with a mistaken pre-election notice publication
by the Secretary of State. Although a mistake was made, the challengers
did not take advantage of the proper remedy available to them but waited
until the eleventh hour and asked a court to strike the matter from the
ballot.... The seeking of the wrong remedy in the wrong court in the
case now before us did not preserve the mandatory nature of the election
laws after the election.
Id. at 220, 843 S.W.2d at 803 (citation omitted).
103. It is worth noting, however, the court would likely require strict compliance
if the requirements for publication were stipulated by the Arkansas Constitution
rather than by statutory law. See, e.g., Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885
S.W.2d 10 (1994) (discussing the six-month publication rule); see supra notes 91-
94 and accompanying text.
104. Becker, 303 Ark. at 489, 798 S.W.2d at 74.
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2. Ballot Title Requirements
The requirements for judicial review of ballot titles on legislatively
proposed amendments are presently unclear and may, in fact, be
ripe for change. 05 Currently, the ballot title requirements for the
initiative process are not understood to govern constitutional
amendments proposed by the General Assembly. °6 The ballot title
requirements for the initiative process mandate that the ballot title
be (1) intelligible, (2) honest, and (3) impartial. 07 On the other hand,
when the General Assembly submits a proposed amendment, the
ballot title is only required to (1) be sufficient to "distinguish and
identify" the proposal and (2) not be a manifest fraud upon the
public. 0 18 Thus, the current standards for legislatively proposed
amendments are less demanding than the standards for the initiative
process.1°9
105. See id. at 489, 798 S.W.2d at 72. A ballot title is explicitly required by
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-113(c) (Michie 1993). See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
106. Becker, 303 Ark. at 485, 798 S.W.2d at 72; Berry v. Hall, 232 Ark. 648,
651, 339 S.W.2d 433, 435 (1960); see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, though, the Arkansas Supreme Court has strayed from this premise.
For example, in Becker, the court quoted language from cases reviewing Amendment
VII ballot titles during its discussion about whether an Article XIX, § 22 ballot
title constituted a manifest fraud. Becker, 303 Ark. at 487, 798 S.W.2d at 74.
107. Leigh v. Hall, 232 Ark. 558, 339 S.W.2d 104 (1960). The requirements for
ballot titles of initiated amendments subject to Amendment VII are beyond the
scope of this comment. For a good place to begin research, see Bailey v. McCuen,
318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994), where the standards for Amendment VII
ballot titles were recently discussed by the Arkansas Supreme Court:
A ballot title must be free of any misleading tendency whether by am-
plification, omission, or fallacy, and it must not be tinged with partisan
coloring. In addition, a ballot title must be intelligible, honest, and impartial
so that it informs the voters with such clarity that they can cast their
ballots with a fair understanding of the issues presented.
Bailey, 318 Ark. at 284, 884 S.W.2d at 942 (citations omitted).
108. Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. at 487, 798 S.W.2d at 73; see also Becker v.
Riviere, 277 Ark. 252, 641 S.W.2d 2 (1982).
109. Becker, 303 Ark. at 487, 798 S.W.2d at 73. The ballot title requirements
for legislatively proposed amendments grant a high level of deference to the leg-
islature. In fact, every Article XIX, § 22 ballot title that has been challenged before
the Arkansas Supreme Court has survived judicial scrutiny. See id. at 482, 798
S.W.2d at 71; Becker v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 252, 641 S.W.2d 2 (1982); Chaney v.
Bryant, 259 Ark. 294, 532 S.W.2d 741 (1976).
In Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885 S.W.2d 10 (1994), the Arkansas
Supreme Court explained that the reason for the different standards is that the
purpose for the ballot title is different for Article XIX, § 22 than for Amendment
VII:
'Amendment 7 does not require publication of the proposed amendment
except as may be required by the General Assembly, but it does provide
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As a result of the differing standards, the ballot title of a
constitutional amendment could conceivably withstand scrutiny under
Article XIX, Section 22 but fail under Amendment VII.10 In fact,
the differing ballot title requirements have been called questionable
and a "double standard" by the Arkansas Supreme Court."'
Nevertheless, because the court has not yet addressed this issue, the
requirements for ballot titles remain unclear. A practitioner would
be wise to err on the side of caution and apply both sets of
requirements to any challenged amendment.
3. Popular Name Requirements
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the popular name's
function is to enable the electors to vote on each proposed amendment
a safeguard by specifically requiring that the proposed amendment have
a ballot title,' the purpose of which is to 'inform the voter so that he
can mark his ballot with a fair understanding of the issues presented.'
Id. at 271-72, 885 S.W.2d at 11 (quoting Becker v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 252, 641
S.W.2d 2 (1982)). The court further explained that:
[Article XIX § 22] does not specifically require a ballot title. All that is
required is that the proposed amendments . . . 'be so submitted as to
enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.' So, the purpose
of the 'Ballot Title' under art. 19, § 22, is not to inform the voter, but
merely to distinguish and identify the amendment. Voters can be presumed
to be informed as to the contents of the amendment since art. 19, § 22,
specifically requires an extended publication period of six separate monthly
insertions in one newspaper in each county prior to the election. See Jones
v. McDade, 200 Ala. 350, 75 So. 988 (1917).
Walmsley, 318 Ark. at 272, 885 S.W.2d at 11.
110. See Becker, 303 Ark. at 489, 798 S.W.2d at 74. The court's explanation
for the differing requirements suggests rationalization rather than concrete reasoning.
See supra note 109. The court's analysis fails to account for the reality that the
average voter enters the voting booth with little knowledge about the contents of
a proposed amendment and will "derive their information about it from the ballot
title." Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740. 748, 43 S.W.2d 356, 360 (1931);
see also Kennedy, supra note 1, at 9 n.42. In addition, the court's entire explanation
hinges on the immaterial fact that Amendment VII explicitly requires a ballot title.
Nevertheless, Amendment VII does not explicitly require the ballot title to be
intelligible, honest, and impartial. See ARK. CONST. amend. VII. Instead, the
Amendment VII ballot title requirements are merely a judicial creation. See Kennedy,
supra note 1, at 9. At least for now, the court appears unwilling to articulate a
legitimate reason for its position that judicial creation of strict standards is ap-
propriate for initiated amendments but not for legislatively proposed amendments.
111. Becker, 303 Ark. at 489, 798 S.W.2d at 74. In Becker, the Arkansas Supreme
Court stated that it "question[ed] the propriety of such a double standard" and
gave "notice of [its] intention to prospectively reconsider [its] cases at the next
opportunity." Id. (emphasis added). The court had its "next" opportunity to
address this issue in Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885 S.W.2d 10 (1994),
but decided the case on other grounds. Walmsley indicates a reluctance by the
court to overrule past decisions on Article XIX, § 22 ballot title standards.
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separately. 1 2 In addition, the popular name is used to facilitate voter
discussion and proposal identification before the election." 3 The
popular name cannot, however, contain catch phrases or slogans
that tend to mislead or give partisan coloring to a proposal."
4
Although it may seem that these standards are more restrictive than
the standards for ballot titles," 5 the Arkansas Supreme Court has
not found the popular name of a single legislatively proposed
amendment insufficient.16 Thus, the popular name standards for
legislatively proposed amendments are probably no more exacting
than the ballot title requirements.
C. Adoption by the Electorate
1. Majority of Electors
Article XIX, Section 22 provides that "if a majority of the
electors voting at ... [the] election adopt such amendments the
same shall become a part of this Constitution.1" 7 The plain meaning
of the provision indicates that a proposed amendment is adopted
only if a majority of electors who voted at the general election,
rather than a majority of electors who voted on the amendment,
cast their votes in favor of the proposed amendment." 8 This
interpretation, however, is not the law.
In Combs v. Gray,"9 the Arkansas Supreme Court construed
the "majority of electors" provision in Article XIX, Section 22
112. Chaney v. Bryant, 259 Ark. 294, 297, 532 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1976). A
popular name is required by statute. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
113. Becker, 303 Ark. at 488, 798 S.W.2d at 74 (quoting Pafford v. Hall, 217
Ark. 734, 233 S.W.2d 72 (1950)). Ironically, even though the court has gone to
great lengths to establish that Amendment VII requirements do not govern Article
XIX, § 22, Pafford is an Amendment VII case cited as authority in an Article
XIX, § 22 case. See infra note 114.
114. Becker, 303 Ark. at 488, 798 S.W.2d at 74 (citing Arkansas Women's
Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984)). Notice that
although Amendment VII requirements presumably do not govern Article XIX,
§ 22, Arkansas Women's Political Caucus is an Amendment VII case cited as
authority in an Article XIX, § 22 case. See supra note 113.
115. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
116. See Becker, 303 Ark. at 482, 798 S.W.2d at 71; Chaney, 259 Ark. 294,
532 S.W.2d at 741.
117. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22 (1874) (emphasis added).
118. See Combs v. Gray, 170 Ark. 956, 962, 281 S.W. 918, 920 (1926) (emphasis
added).
119. 170 Ark. 956, 281 S.W. 918 (1926), overruling Hildreth v. Taylor, 117 Ark.
465, 175 S.W. 40 (1915).
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together with a similar provision in Amendment VII. 20 Amendment
VII provides that a proposed amendment is required to receive a
majority of the votes cast on the proposed amendment, rather than
the votes cast at the election, in order to become a part of the
constitution.12' The court decided that this provision in Amendment
VII should also apply to amendments proposed by the General
Assembly pursuant to Article XIX, Section 22. 122 Thus, an amendment
proposed by the General Assembly is adopted when a majority of
electors voting on the amendment cast their votes in favor of the
amendment .123
120. Combs, 170 Ark. at 967, 281 S.W. at 922. The court has occasionally cited
a case construing one provision and applied it to the other. See supra notes 113-
14, where the court cited Amendment VII cases for authority in Article XIX, § 22
cases. However, Combs is unusual because the court construed the language of
Amendment VII together with Article XIX, Section 22. Yet, the court has historically
and consistently repeated the proposition that the law governing Article XIX, Section
22 is separate from the law governing initiated amendments. See supra notes 6-7
and accompanying text. Clearly, the accuracy of this proposition is questionable.
The decision in Combs is unusual for another reason. Generally, when language
in a constitutional provision is unambiguous and complete, a court will give the
provision the effect of its plain meaning. See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Matthews, 249
Ark. 341, 459 S.W.2d 110 (1970) (holding that statutory requirements which provided
for a special election in elections where no candidate receives a majority of votes
cast contravene a plurality provision of a constitutional article and was therefore
void). But see infra note 122 for an explanation of the court's decision in Combs.
121. ARK. CONST. amend. VII; see also Combs, 170 Ark. at 962, 281 S.W. at
920. Amendment VII specifically provides:
Any measure submitted to the people as herein provided shall take effect
and become law when approved by a majority of the votes cast upon
such measure, and not otherwise, and shall not be required to receive a
majority of the electors voting at such election.
This section shall be not construed to deprive any member of the General
Assembly of the right to introduce any measure, but no measure shall be
submitted to the people by the General Assembly, except a proposed
constitutional amendment or amendments as provided for in this Consti-
tution.
ARK. CONST. amend. VII.
122. Combs, 170 Ark. at 962, 281 S.W. at 920. The court reasoned that requiring
an amendment proposed by the General Assembly to be adopted by a majority
of votes cast at the election, rather than a majority of votes cast on the amendment,
would "result in the practical abrogation of submitting amendments by the Leg-
islature; . . . [because] persons interested in amending the Constitution . . . would,
in the very nature of things, adopt the initiative method." Id. Amendment VII,
by its plain language, requires only a majority of votes cast upon the measure.
See ARK. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added). This requirement makes adoption
of an amendment easier than where adoption by a majority of votes cast at the
election is required. Thus, if the court required a legislatively proposed amendment
to be adopted by a majority of votes cast at the election, rather than a majority
of votes cast on the amendment, everyone seeking to amend the constitution would
choose Amendment VII over Article XIX, § 22 for its easier adoption requirement.
123. Combs, 170 Ark. at 962, 281 S.W. at 920.
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2. Determining that an Amendment Has Received the
Required Number of Votes
Whether or not a proposed amendment has been adopted by
the requisite number of votes is a judicial question. 24 However, the
legislature may prescribe evidentiary rules for determining whether
an amendment has received the required number of votes, so long
as the rules reasonably tend to prove the fact of adoption. 21
Accordingly, the legislature has enacted rules governing the
determination of whether an amendment has received sufficient votes.
The rules provide that precinct judges, clerks, and the election
commissioners in each county shall count, tabulate, and return the
vote on each measure at the same time and in the same manner as
the vote for candidates is tabulated, canvassed, and returned. 26
Additionally, the county election board shall certify and deliver an
abstract of all votes cast on a measure to the Secretary of State
within fifteen days after the election. 27 The Secretary of State then
has ten days to canvass and certify to the Governor and the State
Board of Election Commissioners all the returns on each measure. 12
Unless a measure specifies otherwise, an adopted measure shall go
into effect within thirty days after the election, provided the Governor
makes a proclamation that the measure has been adopted. 29 No
decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court have directly addressed
the issue whether these provisions are mandatory or directory.'30
124. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Kavanaugh, 78 Ark. 468, 473, 96 S.W. 409,
411 (1906).
125. Kavanaugh, 78 Ark. at 475-76, 96 S.W. at 412; see also Op. Att'y Gen.
82-152 (Sept. 23, 1982). This issue is unlikely to be a problem now that an amendment
needs to receive only a majority of those votes cast on the measure in order to
become law. Kavanaugh was decided during the time when an amendment proposed
by the General Assembly needed a majority of votes cast at the general election.
See, e.g., Combs, 170 Ark. at 962, 281 S.W. at 920. Determining the number of
votes cast at an election is much more difficult than determining the number of
votes cast on a measure. See, e.g., Kavanaugh, 78 Ark. at 474-75, 96 S.W. at
412.
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-119(a) (Michie 1993). For the time and manner of
tabulation, canvassing, and returning of votes on candidates, see ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 7-5-315, -701 to -706 (Michie 1993).
127. Id. § 7-9-119(b).
128. Id. § 7-9-119(c).
129. Id. § 7-9-119(d); see also Op. Att'y Gen. 82-152 (Sept. 23, 1982).
130. As a general rule, enforcement of the election laws is considered mandatory
before the election, but only directory after the election. Donn v. McCuen, 303
Ark. 415, 417, 797 S.W.2d 455, 456 (1990). The question then becomes: Does the
determination of the number of votes occur before or after the election? Technically
at least, the determination of the number of votes occurs after the electorate votes,
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D. Judicial Review
1. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The Arkansas Supreme Court has only appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving legislatively proposed amendments.", Stated
another way, the court does not have original jurisdiction over
challenges to legislatively proposed amendments.'32 There is some
authority, however, to suggest that even in cases involving these
challenges, the court may have original jurisdiction in the issuance
of a writ of quo warranto.'33
The standard of review for cases involving challenges to the
validity of amendments proposed by the General Assembly is de
novo.13 4 An appeal "opens the whole case for review as if no decision
had been made" in the lower court.'
35
and thus, one might logically conclude that the determination occurs after the
election. On the other hand, the determination of the number of votes is part of
the larger process of an election. Even when the voting portion of the election is
over, the tabulation portion still needs to be completed to determine the outcome.
Thus, it is unclear whether the determination of the number of votes occurs before,
during, or after an election, and consequently, it is unclear how the rule in Donn
will affect judicial review of compliance with these provisions.
131. Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 485, 798 S.W.2d 71, 72 (1990). However,
the court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases attacking the sufficiency
of petitions of initiated amendments, pursuant to Amendment VI. ARK. CONST.
amend. VII; Berry v. Hall, 232 Ark. 648, 650, 339 S.W.2d 433, 434 (1960).
During the regular session of 1995, Representative Courtway proposed an amend-
ment that would give the Arkansas Supreme Court original jurisdiction over any
challenges to legislatively proposed amendments. H.J. Res. 1012, 80th Gen. As-
sembly, Reg. Sess. (1995). The General Assembly referred the measure to the House
Committee on State Agencies and Governmental Affairs, but the committee had
taken no action on the measure at the time the regular session was adjourned.
See H.J. Res. 1012, 80th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995) (as summarized in the
Westlaw Bill Tracking database, April 9, 1995).
132. Berry, 232 Ark. at 653, 339 S.W.2d at 436. The Arkansas Constitution
provides that "[tihe Supreme Court, except in cases otherwise provided by this
Constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only . . . ." ARK. CoNsr. art. 7, § 4.
The constitution, however, does not provide "otherwise"; in other words, the
constitution does not expressly provide that the court has original jurisdiction in
cases involving Article XIX, § 22 amendments. Berry, 232 Ark. at 653, 339 S.W.2d
at 436. See supra note 131.
133. Berry, 232 Ark. at 653, 339 S.W.2d at 436 (quoting Road Improvement Dist.
No. 4 of Prairie County v. Mobley, 150 Ark. 149, 150, 233 S.W. 929, 929 (1921)).
This proposition was stated by the court in dictum. See id. A writ of quo warranto
is a common law writ "designed to test whether a person exercising power is legally
entitled to do so .... [The writ] is not ordinarily available to regulate the manner
of exercising such powers." BLACK's LAW DIC ONARY 1256 (6th ed. 1990).
134. See Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 486, 798 S.W.2d 71, 73 (1990).
135. Becker, 303 Ark. at 486, 798 S.W.2d at 73. "It has been the invariable
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2. Presumption of Validity Upon Adoption by the People
There is an advantage to challenging the constitutionality of an
amendment proposed by the General Assembly before the people
have an opportunity to vote on the measure at an election. 36 After
a proposed constitutional amendment has been adopted by the people,
"every reasonable presumption, both of law and fact, will be indulged
in favor of its validity."' 7 However, a party can overcome or rebut
this presumption where constitutional requirements for submission
of a legislatively proposed amendment "are disregarded or compliance
[has been] totally omitted."' 38
A review of some cases will illustrate how this presumption of
validity affects judicial review of legislatively proposed amendments.
In Chaney v. Bryant,3 9 the most recent case on this issue, the
Arkansas Supreme Court adjudged as valid an amendment which
practice of this court not to remand a case to a chancery court for further proceedings
and proof where we can plainly see what the inequities of the parties are, but
rather to render such decree here as should have been rendered below." Id. (quoting
Ferguson v. Green, 266 Ark. 556, 587 S.W.2d 18 (1979)).
136. See, e.g., Chaney v. Bryant, 259 Ark. 294, 532 S.W.2d 741 (1976); see also
Coutler v. Dodge, 197 Ark. 812, 828, 125 S.W.2d 115, 122 (1939) (Mehaffy, J.,
concurring).
137. Chaney, 259 Ark. at 298, 532 S.W.2d at 744 (citing Southern Ry. Co. v.
Fowler, 497 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1973); Board of Liquidation v. Whitney-Central
Trust & Sav. Bank, 122 So. 850 (La. 1929); Hammond v. Clark, 71 S.E. 479 (Ga.
1911); People v. Sours, 74 P. 167 (Colo. 1903); Keenan v. Price, 195 P.2d 662
(Idaho 1948); State v. Cooney, 225 P. 1007 (Mont. 1924); Larkin v. Gronna, 285
N.W. 59 (N.D. 1939)) (citation order in original).
There are several different ways to state the Chaney presumption. For example,
in Chaney the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing decisions in other jurisdictions,
stated that "[a] defect in submission which is a mere irregularity is cured by
adoption by the people when the amendment has been duly proposed and actually
published and submitted to the people without any question having been raised
prior to the election." Chaney, 259 Ark. at 299, 532 S.W.2d at 744-45. Another
example follows:
Where the vital requirements for a proposed amendment have been met
by the vote of legislators and entry of the measure on the legislative
journals as required by the Constitution and there has been substantial,
though not literal, compliance with procedural requirements for submission,
the courts should not invalidate the adoption of the amendment by popular
vote.
Id. at 299, 532 S.W.2d at 745.
138. Chaney, 259 Ark. at 298, 532 S.W.2d at 744 (citing McAdams v. Henley,
169 Ark. 97, 273 S.W. 355 (1925)). See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text
for a discussion of McAdams.
139. 259 Ark. 294, 532 S.W.2d 741 (1976). In Chaney, the petitioner challenged
the sufficiency of the ballot title of the proposed amendment, claiming that it was
misleading. Chaney, 259 Ark. at 295, 532 S.W.2d at 742.
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had already been adopted by a majority vote. The court stated that
it would be "absurd" to invalidate the amendment merely because
the ballot title might be misleading, reasoning that the amendment
had already been adopted by the people. 40 The court further justified
its holding, stating that no specific constitutional or statutory provision
required a ballot title for amendments proposed by the General
Assembly. 141
In the earlier case of McAdams v. Henley, 42 however, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held an amendment invalid despite the fact
that it had been adopted by a majority vote. The court reasoned
that when the journals do not reflect that the house and senate
passed the same measure, the amendment is "void on account of
the failure of the General Assembly to enter the proposal in accordance
with the express mandate of the Constitution."'' 43 The court in
McAdams did not explicitly mention the presumption of validity,
but the court in Chaney cited McAdams as an example of how the
presumption can be rebutted.'"
In Coulter v. Dodge, 45 a case decided after McAdams but before
Chaney, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the validity of an
amendment after it had been adopted by a popular vote
notwithstanding the fact that the journal entries failed to reflect an
immaterial portion of the proposed amendment which had been
approved by both houses.'" Although the majority opinion did not
specifically refer to any presumption created by the adoption of an
amendment by popular vote, the concurring opinion of Justice Mehaffy
140. Id. at 300, 532 S.W.2d at 745.
141. Id.
142. 169 Ark. 97, 273 S.W. 355 (1925). In this case, a proposed amendment
was introduced and approved in the Senate. Id. at 100, 273 S.W. at 356. The
House subsequently made an amendment to the resolution and returned it to the
Senate. Id. at 101, 273 S.W. at 356. The Senate approved the amended resolution,
but the journals did not reflect that the resolution contained the House's amendment.
Id. at 102, 273 S.W. at 357. The measure entered in the Senate's journal was
materially different than the measure submitted to the people. Id.; see supra notes
83-85 and accompanying text.
143. McAdams, 169 Ark. at 112, 273 S.W. at 360.
144. See Chaney, 259 Ark. at 298, 532 S.W.2d at 744.
145. 197 Ark. 812, 125 S.W.2d 115 (1939). In Coulter, the complainant argued
that the amendment should be invalidated because the proposed amendment had
not been entered "in extenso" on the journals of the Houses of the General
Assembly. See id. at 818, 125 S.W.2d at 117. See supra notes 75-90 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case regarding journal entry requirements.
146. See Coulter, 197 Ark. at 822, 125 S.W.2d at 119 ("When the journals of
the two houses are read together in the instant case, it is made certain that both
houses passed the same amendment.").
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specifically referred to the presumption as a reason for upholding
the validity of the amendment.
147
3. Eleventh Hour Challenges
The advantage to challenging amendments proposed by the
General Assembly before an election is somewhat weakened when
the lawsuit is filed at the "eleventh hour," or just before the
election. 148 Still, the mere fact that the lawsuit was filed at the
eleventh hour is probably not sufficient, by itself, to preclude a
court from addressing the merits of the challenger's case. 149 Instead,
a last minute filing probably must be coupled with another infirmity
before a court will explicitly cite the eleventh hour challenge as a
reason for upholding the validity of a legislatively proposed
amendment. For example, where the lawsuit is filed at the last
minute in an incorrect forum 5 ° or where mandamus would have
been a proper remedy,'' the court is likely to either refuse to decide
the case on the merits or hold that the proposed amendment is
valid.'52
147. Id. at 828, 125 S.W.2d at 122 (Mehaffy, J., concurring). Justice Mehaffy's
concurring opinion was the first in Arkansas to articulate the presumption. However,
the court in Chaney did not cite to Mehaffy's concurrence as authority for the
presumption. See Chaney, 259 Ark. at 298-300, 532 S.W.2d at 744-45.
148. See, e.g., Hannah v. Deboer, 311 Ark. 215, 843 S.W.2d 800 (1992); Becker
v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 798 S.W.2d 71 (1990); cf. Berry v. Hall, 232 Ark. 648,
339 S.W.2d 433 (1960) (refusing on other grounds to hear a challenge to a proposed
amendment which was filed at the eleventh hour).
149. See supra note 148. But see Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. at 490, 798
S.W.2d at 75 (Glaze, J., concurring) (stating that the measures should appear on
the ballot in light of the last minute circumstances); see also infra note 152.
Practically speaking, however, eleventh-hour filing can be detrimental to a challenge
of a proposed amendment. The justices will have less time to weigh all the arguments.
In addition, an eleventh hour filing makes it impossible for the court to strike the
proposal from the ballot because the ballots will have already been prepared; the
only available relief would be to enjoin the Secretary of State from certifying and
canvassing the results of the election. See, e.g., Christian Civic Action Comm. v.
McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994); see infra notes 153-54 and ac-
companying text.
150. Berry v. Hall, 232 Ark. 648, 339 S.W.2d 433 (1960) (holding that the
challenge was made at the last minute and the lawsuit was filed originally and
wrongly with the Arkansas Supreme Court rather than a chancery court).
151. Becker, 303 Ark. at 482, 798 S.W.2d at 71 (holding that the challenge was
made at the last minute and mandamus would have been the proper relief).
152. See, e.g., Hannah v. Deboer, 311 Ark. 215, 220, 843 S.W.2d 800, 803
(1992); Becker, 303 Ark. at 482, 798 S.W.2d at 71; cf. Berry v. Hall, 232 Ark.
648, 339 S.W.2d 433 (1960) (refusing on other grounds to consider an eleventh
hour challenge). The concurring opinion by Justice Glaze in Becker lays the foun-
dation for an argument that a last minute challenge, by itself, should preclude a
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4. Relief
Typically, a party challenging the validity of an amendment
proposed by the General Assembly seeks to enjoin the acting Secretary
of State from placing the proposed amendment on the general election
ballot.'53 If it appears that the lawsuit will be decided after the
Secretary of State has printed the ballots, a party may, in the
alternative, seek to enjoin the Secretary of State from canvassing
and certifying the results of the election. 14 Of course, if the relief
requested by the petitioner is impossible or impracticable under the
circumstances, the court may exercise its equitable powers and fashion
a proper remedy.'55
CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Supreme Court should reconcile the current ballot
title and popular name requirements for legislatively proposed amend-
court from addressing the merits of a challenger's case, especially where the electorate
has had the opportunity to adequately hear and reflect on the "pros" and "cons"
of the amendment:
In light of the last-minute circumstances by which these proposed measures
come to this court for review, I have expressed my opinion that both
proposed amendments should be placed on the ballot. See Finn v. McCuen,
303 Ark. 418, 798 S.W.2d 34 (1990) (Glaze, J., dissenting). In each case,
a full text of the amendment had been published and the proponents and
opponents of each amendment have dutifully sounded and revealed the
good and bad points of these measures. . . . I have confidence that the
voters will use their knowledge and common sense when casting their
ballot on these important issues.
Becker, 303 Ark. at 490, 798 S.W.2d at 75 (Glaze, J., concurring). The argument
would be that, in this opinion, Justice Glaze refers to no other reasons for upholding
the amendment except for the "last-minute circumstances" and that "the proponents
and opponents of each amendment have dutifully sounded and revealed the good
and bad points of these measures." Id. A counter-argument, however, would be
that Justice Glaze's reference to the fact that the "full text of the amendment had
been published" impliedly asserts that compliance with publication requirements is
as much a reason to uphold an amendment's validity as the eleventh hour challenge.
See id.
153. See Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 270, 885 S.W.2d 10, 10 (1994).
154. See id.
155. See Chambers v. Manning, 315 Ark. 369, 376, 868 S.W.2d 64, 68 (1993)
("A Chancellor has broad power in fashioning a remedy, limited only to the extent
that it be reasonable and justified by the proof."); see, e.g., Christian Civic Action
Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 243, 884 S.W.2d 605, 606 (1994) (enjoining the
Secretary of State from canvassing and certifying the results of the election even
though the complainant had sought to strike the proposed amendment from the
ballot).
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ments with the requirements for initiated amendments. 5 6 The con-
stitutional history of the amendment process demonstrates why the
requirements for ballot titles and popular names should be the same
for both types of proposed constitutional amendments. Adhering to
a standard that is more deferential to the legislature does not comport
with the intent of the drafters of our current constitution. 5 7 The
state adopted the current method for amending the constitution at
a time when the drafters did not trust politicians and wished to
place more power in the people.'58 Thus, it is contrary to the spirit
and intent of the original drafters to subject ballot titles on amend-
ments proposed by the legislature to lesser scrutiny than ballot titles
on amendments initiated by the people.
Apart from the drafters' intent, another reason Arkansas should
have the same standards for ballot titles and popular names on both
types of proposed amendments is that having two standards is
fundamentally unfair. The General Assembly's ballot title standard
is far easier to meet, 59 but the court has advanced no legitimate
reason why the legislature should be given more deference than the
people.1 60 It is unfair for the court to impose strict, judicially created
requirements on only Amendment VII ballot titles and popular names
without at least articulating a legitimate reason for the double stan-
dard.'161
156. The author hopes that the conclusion in this "practitioner's guide" aids
the lawyer in her efforts to persuade the Arkansas Supreme Court to change the
ballot title and popular name requirements for legislatively proposed amendments.
Although this comment covers a broad spectrum of issues, the ballot title and
popular name requirements present the most obvious target for reform. Conse-
quently, this conclusion narrowly focuses on the reasons such reformation is nec-
essary.
157. It is a general rule of construction that the intent of the drafters at the
time the law was enacted is controlling. See Mears v. Arkansas State Hosp., 265
Ark. 844, 846, 581 S.W.2d 339, 340 (1979).
158. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
161. Generally, the people's reserved power of initiative is greater than the power
of the legislature. Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557 (Calif. 1995). If the people's
power be greater than the legislature's, why are people's initiated amendments
subject to a stricter scrutiny than legislatively proposed amendments in Arkansas?
There is very likely no legitimate reason. Other states typically have more stringent
requirements for legislatively proposed amendments than for initiated amendments.
Cf. Hilsinger v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 444 N.E.2d 936 (Mass. 1983)
(stating that under the Massachusetts Constitution, an initiated amendment must
be approved by the legislature, but it requires fewer votes than a legislatively
proposed amendment to be submitted to the people for adoption). The reasoning
adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court is partly based on the proposition that
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Another reason that Arkansas should have the same standards
for ballot titles and popular names for both initiated amendments
and legislatively proposed amendments is that it seems logical to
have one uniform standard. 162 In Becker v. McCuen, Justice Glaze
illuminated the simple logic of a uniform standard in his concurring
opinion when he wrote: "Certainly, no one would seriously argue
that public officials should have greater discretion or latitude to
mislead voters when wording ballot titles than do citizens who initiate
constitutional proposals. "'163
Consistent with the principles of fairness and logic, and in light
of the drafters' intent, requirements for ballot titles and popular
names on amendments initiated under Amendment VII should be
applicable to ballot titles and popular names on amendments pro-
posed by the General Assembly. However, if the court's past re-
luctance to address the issue' 64 is any indication of its future
disposition, the double standard may remain a part of Arkansas
law despite the preponderant arguments in favor of reform.
the requirements for the initiative process are separate from and do not govern
legislatively proposed amendments. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the accuracy of this proposition is questionable. See supra notes 106, 113,
114, 120.
162. Uniform standards might be beneficial for other matters besides just re-
quirements for ballot titles and popular names. For example, both publication
requirements and jurisdiction are different for the two methods of proposing
amendments. See supra notes 92, 131 and accompanying text. However, the plain
language of the constitution requires differing standards for publication and ju-
risdiction. See supra notes 91, 132 and accompanying text. In fairness to the court,
these are not matters that can be changed by judicial interpretation; rather, the
Arkansas Constitution would have to be amended.
Interestingly, several members of the 80th General Assembly during the 1995
Regular Session attempted to amend the constitutional provisions that govern con-
stitutional amendments. They introduced proposed amendments that were intended
to change publication requirements and give the Arkansas Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over cases involving legislatively proposed amendments. See supra notes
93, 131. The concept of uniform standards apparently appeals to more people than
simply law students and legal scholars.
163. Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 490, 798 S.W.2d 71, 75 (1990) (Glaze,
J., concurring).
164. See supra note 111.
